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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robert Snow Derrick appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict
finding him guilty of felony injury to a child. On appeal, Derrick argues the prosecutor
committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error during her closing argument. He
also argues the trial court erred in one of its evidentiary rulings.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Derrick punched his 13-year-old stepson in the stomach, lacerating his stepson’s
spleen. (Tr., p.125, Ls.7-16, p.133, L.8 – p.146, L.3, p.152, L.21 – p.153, L.10, p.154,
Ls.15-19, p.188, L.23 – p.189, L.4, p.190, L.15 – p.191, L.9, p.193, L.7 – p.203, L.22,
p.230, L.16 – p.231, L.10, p.240, L.6 – p.249, L.9, p.324, L.8 – p.340, L.2.) The state
charged Derrick with felony injury to a child and with misdemeanor domestic battery in
the presence of a child (alleging Derrick also hit his wife in his stepson’s presence). (R.,
pp.69-71.) Following a trial, a jury found Derrick guilty of felony injury to a child but not
guilty of the domestic battery charge. (R., p.164.) Derrick filed a motion for a new trial
(R., pp.193-96), which the district court denied (R., p.197; Tr., p.582, L.9 – p.585, L.12).
Derrick timely appealed from the entry of judgment. (R., pp.198-203, 206-09.)
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ISSUES
Derrick states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct and thereby violated Mr. Derrick’s
unwaived constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial when she
misstated the law in her closing argument?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted an audio
recording without proper foundation from the State?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Derrick failed to carry his burden of demonstrating fundamental error in
relation to his unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct?
2.
Has Derrick failed to show the district court abused its discretion in admitting an
audio recording of Derrick’s interaction with law enforcement over Derrick’s foundation
objection?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Derrick Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Demonstrating Fundamental Error In
Relation To His Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Derrick argues the prosecutor misstated the law

during her closing argument and, in so doing, violated his “unwaived constitutional rights
to due process and a fair trial.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-11.) Derrick’s argument fails; a
review of the challenged statement in light of the record and the applicable law shows no
misconduct, much less misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends

on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v. Severson, 147
Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). Where, as here, a defendant fails to timely
object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, the conviction
will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that
the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).

C.

Derrick Has Failed To Show Any Misconduct, Much Less Misconduct Rising To
The Level Of Fundamental Error
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it “constitutes

fundamental error.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App.
2010). In the absence of an objection “the appellate court’s authority to remedy that error
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is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being deprived
of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.”
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Review without objection
will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that “one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights were violated”; (2) the constitutional error is “clear or
obvious” on the record, “without the need for any additional information” including
information “as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3) the
“defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,”
generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error “affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings.” Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Derrick was charged with felony injury to a child, in violation of I.C. § 181501(1). (R., pp.69-71.) Consistent with the language of both the statute and the pattern
jury instruction, the district court instructed the jury that, to find Derrick guilty, the state
must have proved, inter alia, that Derrick “willfully, by causing a traumatic injury to [his
stepson, R.B.’s] abdomen and/or spleen, caused [R.B.’s] person or health to be injured”
and that he did so under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm
or death to [R.B.].” (R., p.173.) The court further instructed the jury that “[t]he word
‘willfully’ as used in this instruction means acting where a reasonable person would know
the act is likely to result in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health,
safety or well-being of the child.” (R., p.173 (compare with I.C. § 18-1501(5) and I.C.J.I.
1244).)
In arguing to the jury that it should find Derrick guilty of felony injury to a child,
the prosecutor, during closing argument, referred to the foregoing instruction and
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summarized the evidence that, from the state’s perspective, proved each element of the
crime. (See Tr., p.521, L.16 – p.528, L.10.) Specifically, regarding the mental state
element of felony injury to a child, the prosecutor stated:
Let’s go to willfully. Very bottom of that page. Look at the
definition of willfully. A reasonable person would know the act is likely,
could, potentially, pick the word you like, but the court has used likely to
result in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety,
or well being of the child.
(Tr., p.524, Ls.8-14 (emphasis added).)
Derrick did not object to the prosecutor’s argument below, but he contends on
appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error
by “urg[ing] the jury to ‘pick the word you like’ when evaluating Mr. Derrick’s mental
state for the charged offense.” (Appellant’s brief, p.9.) According to Derrick, “[b]y
informing the jury that they [sic] only had to find a reasonable person could, potentially,
or might know the act would cause injury, the prosecutor” misstated the law and
“misrepresented and diminished her burden of proof on Mr. Derrick’s mental state.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) Derrick’s argument is without merit; he has failed to show
that the complained of statement was improper, much less that it rose to the level of
fundamental error.
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in closing argument. State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009); State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948
P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995).
He or she is entitled to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 Idaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141
(citing State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). A prosecutor may
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not “attempt[] to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury
instructions and the evidence admitted during trial,” however, as doing so “impacts a
defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245
P.3d at 979; see also State v. Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 170, 191 P.3d 244, 248 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007)) (“It
is prosecutorial misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law in closing arguments.”).
Contrary to Derrick’s claims on appeal, the prosecutor’s statement in this case –
that “willfully” means “[a] reasonable person would know the act is likely, could,
potentially, pick the word you like, but the court has used likely to result in injury or harm
or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety, or well being of the child” – ultimately
did not misstate the law. The state readily acknowledges that “willfully,” in the context
of a felony injury to child charge, means “acting or failing to act where a reasonable
person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or is likely
to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of the child.” I.C. § 18-1501(5);
accord I.C.J.I. 1244. Although the prosecutor appears to have initially used the words
“could” and “potentially” as synonymous with the word “likely” and told the jurors to
“pick the word you like,” she ultimately told the jury that the term “willfully,” as used in
the court’s instructions, meant a reasonable person would know the act “is likely to result
in injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety, or well being of the
child.” (Tr., p.524, Ls.8-14.) This was a correct statement of the law.
Even assuming the challenged statement was improper, Derrick has not met his
burden of demonstrating it rose to the level of fundamental error. As noted above, the
first prong of the fundamental error test requires Derrick to demonstrate a constitutional
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violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Derrick argues that the prosecutor’s
statement violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial because the
words “could” and “potentially” “refer to something that might happen, as opposed to
something that is likely to happen”; therefore, Derrick contends, the prosecutor’s use of
those words, combined with her suggestion to the jury to “pick the word you like,”
“misrepresented and diminished her burden of proof” on the mental state element of the
crime. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) Derrick’s argument is unavailing for at least two
reasons.
First, the argument ignores the fact that the jury was specifically instructed that it
must “apply the law set forth in [the court’s] instructions,” that it must “follow [the
court’s] instructions regardless of [the jury’s] own opinion of what the law is or should
be, or what either side may state the law to be,” that it was to “follow all the rules” as
explained by the court, and that “[i]f anyone states a rule of law different from any”
provided by the court, it was the court’s instruction that the jury “must follow.” (R.,
pp.149, 168.) Derrick does not dispute that the actual elements instruction was a correct
statement of the law; his only argument is effectively that the jury ignored that instruction
and could have concluded he was guilty based on a lower standard than required by the
court’s instruction. The law, however, presumes the contrary. See, e.g., State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, 7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013) (“Idaho appellate courts … presume that a jury
follows the instructions it is given.” (citation omitted)).
Second, despite the prosecutor’s initial use of the words “could” and “potentially,”
a review of the prosecutor’s substantive argument on the willfulness element shows the
prosecutor did not urge the jury to convict on a lesser standard of proof than required by

7

the law as set forth in the court’s instruction. Instead, the prosecutor argued that the
evidence supported a finding that Derrick acted “willfully” because a reasonable person
in his position would have known that punching R.B. in the stomach was “likely” to
injure R.B. and/or to endanger his health and well-being. She stated:
… What is the act? The act has been testified to as a punch to the stomach
and/or a throw to the deck. A reasonable person, what does that mean?
This instruction is not asking you to decide whether this defendant is
reasonable. But it is asking you to decide what a reasonable person would
know, given the facts of this case. What a reasonable person. The
common man. The every man in our society. To do that, you need to look
at what you know about Robert Derrick.
Robert Derrick is an adult. He’s 46 years old. He stands six foot
tall, 175 pounds. He knows [R.B.] is 13, he knows [R.B.’s] height, he
knows [R.B.’s] weight. Given these facts, Robert Derrick had reason to
know that, as an adult with his height, with his weight, if he punched
[R.B.], a child who was shorter and weighs less than him, that if he
punches [R.B.] in the stomach, [R.B.’s] health or person likely or could be
injured or endangered.
(Tr., p.524, L.15 – p.525, L.7), and
Given all these facts, Robert Derrick had a reason to know that as
an adult in a rage like he was at that time, if he punched [R.B.] in the
stomach, [R.B.’s] health or person could likely be injured or endangered.
(Tr., p.526, Ls.16-19).
Even assuming Derrick could overcome the first prong of the Perry test for
fundamental error, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct nevertheless fails on the second
prong of the test, which requires Derrick to demonstrate that the error he asserts is “clear
or obvious” on the record, without the need for any additional information, including
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at
978. Derrick argues that, because the willfulness element of felony injury to a child
“elevates the conduct from ‘innocent mistakes in judgment’ to a criminal offense,” “there
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is no tactical or strategic reason for defense counsel to fail to object to the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the law on [that] essential element of the crime.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.10-11 (citing State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 372-73, 64 P.3d 296, 298-99 (2002).)
Derrick’s argument is belied by a review of the trial record, which shows at least one
conceivable reason why Derrick’s counsel would not have objected to the prosecutor’s
argument, even assuming it misstated the law. Derrick’s defense at trial was not that he
did not willfully injure R.B., it was that he did not injure R.B. at all. (See generally Tr.,
p.116, L.8 – p.117, L.11, p.532, L.14 – p.547, L.2.) Derrick testified that he never
punched R.B. in the stomach (Tr., p.405, Ls.8-14), and his counsel suggested, both
through his examination of witnesses and during his closing argument, that R.B.
sustained the injury to his spleen during an altercation with one of his step-siblings, when
Derrick was not even present (Tr., p.157, L.23 – p.178, L.20, p.209, L.22 – p.225, L.16,
p.291, L.7 – p.302, L.19, p.340, L.15 – p.343, L.9, p.365, L.22 – p.371, L.5, p.449, L.16 –
p.457, L.12, p.461, L.20 – p.470, L.18, p.477, Ls.4-20, p.532, L.14 – p.547, L.2).
Because Derrick denied the conduct forming the basis of the felony injury to child charge
occurred at all, trial counsel would have gained nothing by objecting to the prosecutor’s
argument regarding the willfulness element and, in fact, could have reasonably concluded
that doing so would only invite the jury to reach that element of the charge.
Finally, Derrick has failed to show he was actually prejudiced by the prosecutor’s
statement. Even assuming that the statement could be construed in a vacuum as having
misstated the law, there is no reasonable probability it in any way “affected the outcome
of the trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In an attempt to carry his burden
on this issue, Derrick merely rehashes his assertion that, “[i]f the jurors accepted the
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prosecutor’s invitation to pick the word he or she liked for the reasonable person
standard, the State did not have to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) Derrick’s argument fails because, as explained in
greater detail above, the district court specifically instructed the jury that it was to apply
the law as set forth in the court’s instructions, not as represented by counsel. (R., pp.149,
168.) Derrick has not even mentioned the court’s instructions, much less made any effort
to overcome the presumption that the jury followed them. Nor has Derrick acknowledged
that his defense at trial was that he never injured R.B. at all, not that he did so but that his
conduct was not “willful.”
Admittedly, because the jury clearly rejected Derrick’s version of events and
found he was the person who caused R.B.’s injury, it was necessarily required to
determine whether Derrick’s conduct was willful. Derrick, however, never disputed that,
if the jurors believed the state’s witnesses’ testimony that he punched R.B. in the
abdomen, such conduct was anything other than willful. Nor could he because the state’s
evidence on this element was overwhelming. The evidence showed Derrick—who was
six feet tall, weighed 175 pounds, and was “much stronger” than his 13-year-old stepson,
R.B. (Tr., p.162, Ls.13-19, p.283, Ls.10-15)—“grabbed [R.B.] in a choke hold,” dragged
him across the room, punched him in the abdomen and threw him to the ground (Tr.,
p.139, L.1 – p.144, L.2, p.198, L.17 – p.202, L.16). The punch was so forceful that it
caused R.B. to cry, made it difficult for him get up off the ground and, ultimately,
lacerated his spleen. (Tr., p.202, L.18 – p.203, L.2, p.240, L.6 – p.249, L.9.) In light of
this evidence, a rational jury who believed that Derrick punched R.B. in the manner
testified to by the state’s witnesses could only conclude that a reasonable person in
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Derrick’s position would have known that his conduct was “likely to result in injury or
harm or [was] likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of” R.B. and, as
such, the conduct was willful.
In light of the foregoing evidence that overwhelmingly established Derrick’s guilt
on the “willfully” element of felony injury to a child, and assuming, as this Court must,
that the jury followed the court’s instructions, State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198
P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008), there is no reasonable possibility the prosecutor’s
statement affected the outcome of the trial. Derrick has failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating fundamental error with respect to his unpreserved claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. This Court should therefore decline to review the claim for the first time on
appeal.

II.
Derrick Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Concluding The
State Laid Adequate Foundation For The Admission Of An Audio Recording Of A
Portion Of Derrick’s Interaction With Law Enforcement
A.

Introduction And Relevant Facts
During the state’s case-in-chief, R.B. and R.B.’s mother both testified that Derrick

put R.B. in a headlock; then, using his free arm, Derrick punched R.B. in the stomach,
opened a sliding glass door, and threw R.B. out the door and onto the deck of their home.
(Tr., p.139, L.21 – p.144, L.5, p.160, L.14 – p.164, L.4, p.193, L.7 – p.203, L.12.)
Officers Hayes and Jansen testified that they responded to Derrick’s residence on the
night of the charged crimes, and both officers testified regarding the substance of their
conversations with Derrick and R.B.’s mother, as well as to their observations of
Derrick’s demeanor during their interactions with him. (Tr., p.272, L.3 – p.276, L.1,
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p.280, L.6 – p.281, L.6, p.287, L.15 – p.289, L.1, p.348, L.15 – p.360, L.6, p.363, Ls.220.) During Officer Jansen’s testimony, the state admitted several audio recordings,
including a recording of Officer Jansen’s and Officer Hayes’ conversations with Derrick.
(Tr., p.352, L.15 – p.363, L.23, p.367, Ls.15-20; State’s Exhibits 5-8.) Officer Hayes
testified his conversation with Derrick lasted approximately 35 minutes, but the audio
recording that was being admitted (State’s Exhibit 5) was not that long because it had
been “condensed to omit” “dead space” and irrelevant information. (Tr., p.352, L.15 –
p.355, L.13.) On the audio, Derrick denied having hit R.B. or R.B.’s mother but admitted
to having “grabbed” R.B. “around the shoulders” because, according to Derrick, R.B. had
come at him with a knife. 1 (State’s Exhibit 5 at 3:10-3:40.)
Derrick testified in his own defense and denied having hit R.B. in the stomach.
(Tr., p.405, Ls.8-14.) He admitted that he “grab[bed]” R.B. “[a]round his shoulders” but
again claimed he did so because R.B. “came at [him] with a knife.” (Tr., p.400, L.8 –
p.401, L.7.) According to Derrick, he put one arm around R.B.’s shoulders and the other
around R.B.’s knee, then walked R.B. through the door and “let go” of him on the deck.
(Tr., p.400, Ls.19-24, p.403, L.4 – p.404, L.19.) When asked whether he had to slide the
door open, Derrick responded, “No,” and claimed the door was already open because it
was “[h]ot out.” (Tr., p.403, Ls.8-13.) Derrick implied that R.B. and R.B.’s mother were
being untruthful when they testified that Derrick had one arm free to punch R.B. and open
the door, explaining, “If I would have switched arms or taken one hand to the door, [R.B.]

1

Derrick admitted that, by the time he grabbed R.B., R.B. had already dropped the knife
and no longer posed any threat to him. (State’s Exhibit 5 at 3:10-3:40; see also Tr.,
p.439, L.22 – p.440, L.7.)
12

would have gotten away for sure because I got a wiggly kid in my arm, one arm isn’t
going to control him.” (Tr., p.403, Ls.20-23.) He also testified that he was nervous and
shaky when talking to the police. (Tr., p.444, L.12 – p.445, L.10.)
During rebuttal, the state called Officer Hayes to give further testimony regarding
his observations of Derrick’s demeanor on the night of charged incident. Officer Hayes
testified, contrary to Derrick’s testimony, that it “was fairly cold” that night and, in fact,
during his interaction with officers Derrick “asked if he could get a jacket.” (Tr., p.478,
L.20 – p.479, L.19.) He also testified that although Derrick seemed “a little bit” nervous
and “anxious to get out of there,” he did not appear to be “scared” and “seemed to make
light of the situation.” (Tr., p.479, L.20 – p.480, L.19.) Officer Hayes testified that both
he and Officer Jansen recorded their interactions with Derrick. (Tr., p.481, Ls.3-8.) The
prosecutor then handed Officer Hayes an “audio disk,” marked as State’s Exhibit 9, after
which the following exchange occurred:
Q [By Prosecutor:] … Do you recognize that?
A Yes.
Q How is it that you recognize it?
A I recently reviewed this audio disk and signed the back of the
disk or the envelope that it’s in.
Q Are you in that audio?
A No.
Q Who’s in that audio?
A Mr. Derrick and Officer Jansen.
Q And when you came out to talk to Mr. Derrick, did you – you were
recording as well?
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A Yes.
Q Did you compare your audio with Officer Jansen’s?
A Not side by side, no.
Q You both were recording at the same time?
A Yes, we should have been.
Q What is on – what is on this audio?
A This is a conversation between Mr. Derrick and Officer Jansen
while I was inside speaking with [R.B.’s mother].
Q Did you – did you recognize Mr. Derrick’s voice on there?
A Yes.
Q Did you recognize Officer Jansen’s voice on there?
A Yes.
Q And is that, I mean, from what you observed, is that an accurate
copy of part of that conversation?
A Yes.
(Tr., p.481, L.9 – p.482, L.14 (bolding in original).)
Immediately following the above exchange, the prosecutor moved to admit the
audio recording into evidence. (Tr., p.482, Ls.15-16.) Defense counsel objected, arguing
the state had failed to lay adequate foundation for the exhibit’s admission. (Tr., p.482,
L.17.) Specifically, counsel argued:
This is not – this is Officer Jansen’s conversation, partial
conversation. The State has said that they have recordings that overlap to
some extent. I’m not sure he said these two overlap to some extent. I just
don’t think that the foundation for Officer Jansen’s conversation can be
laid second-handedly by Officer Hayes.
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(Tr., p.482, Ls.19-25.) 2

Before ruling on the objection, the district court sought

clarification whether the portion of the conversation that was contained in State’s Exhibit
9 was included in any of the previously admitted audio recordings. (Tr., p.483, Ls.1-5.)
The prosecutor responded, “No, it’s not,” and explained, “This is part of the extra stuff
that was taken out, like the joking and talking about the weather and things like that.”
(Tr., p.483, Ls.4-8.) With that clarification, the court overruled Derrick’s foundation
objection and admitted the exhibit, reasoning:
The witness has testified that as to what this audio is. It purports to be
statements of the defendant, which are certainly admissible. There’s no
indication of lack of accuracy of the recordings, so I think there’s
sufficient foundation.
(Tr., p.483, Ls.9-15). The state then published the audio recording, on which Derrick
could be heard telling Officer Jansen that he was “kind of chilly,” asking if he could
“grab [his] jacket,” and intermittently laughing and making jokes throughout the recorded
conversation. (See generally State’s Exhibit 9.)
On appeal, Derrick “asserts the district court abused its discretion by admitting the
audio recording of a portion of his conversation with Officer Jansen (State’s Exhibit 9),”
contending “the State did not provide a proper foundation to authenticate the recording as
an accurate and complete representation of that portion of the conversation.”

2

Although it is not entirely clear from the trial transcript why the prosecutor did not call
Officer Jansen to lay foundation for the admission of State’s Exhibit 9, it appears likely
the prosecutor did not do so because Officer Jansen was ill and was almost unable to
appear and testify in the state’s case-in-chief. (Compare Tr., p.345, L.20 – p.348, L.2
(court recessing trial at 10:20 a.m. on December 21, 2016, after prosecutor represented
that Officer Jansen was ill and unable to appear as a witness) with p.348, Ls.5-19 (trial
resumes at 11:02 a.m. on December 21, 2016, and Officer Jansen takes the stand and
testifies in state’s case-in-chief) and p.478, L.10 – p.488, L.22 (prosecutor calls Officer
Hayes as sole rebuttal witness on afternoon of December 21, 2016).)
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(Appellant’s brief, p.12.) Derrick’s argument fails. Application of the law to the facts of
this case supports the district court’s determination that the state presented adequate
foundation for the admission of the audio recording. Even if the court erred in its
evidentiary ruling, the error was harmless and did not violate Derrick’s substantial rights.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence.

State v. Harris, 141 Idaho 721, 724, 117 P.3d 135, 138 (Ct. App. 2005). A trial court’s
determination of whether evidence is supported by proper foundation is reviewed on
appeal for an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 276, 77
P.3d 956, 965 (2003); State v. Bradley, 158 Idaho 66, 69, 343 P.3d 508, 511 (Ct. App.
2015); State v. Salazar, 153 Idaho 24, 26, 278 P.3d 426, 428 (Ct. App. 2012).

C.

The State Laid Adequate Foundation For The Admission Of The Audio Recording
The foundational requirements for the admission of evidence are governed by

Idaho Rule of Evidence 901, which provides:
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
I.R.E. 901(a). Rule 901(b) sets forth “an illustrative, but not exhaustive” list of examples
of ways in which the foundational requirements of I.R.E. 901(a) may be satisfied. State
v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 96, 334 P.3d 280, 287 (2014); Bradley, 158 Idaho at 69, 343 P.3d
at 511. Relevant to this case, foundation may be established through the “[t]estimony of a
witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be,” I.R.E. 901(b)(1); by
“[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,
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taken in conjunction with circumstances,” I.R.E. 901(b)(4); and by “[i]dentification of a
voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or
recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances
connecting it with the alleged speaker,” I.R.E. 901(b)(5).
A review of the record in this case in light of the requirements of I.R.E. 901
supports the district court’s discretionary determination that the state laid adequate
foundation for the admission of State’s Exhibit 9. Officer Hayes testified that he had
“recently reviewed” the audio recording and recognized it as “a conversation between Mr.
Derrick and Officer Jansen.” (Tr., p.481, L.9 – p.482, L.5.) Although the officer testified
he was not present during the portion of the conversation captured on State’s Exhibit 9
(Tr., p.482, Ls.2-5), he personally participated in other conversations with Derrick and
Officer Jansen on the night in question, he was aware that Officer Jansen was recording
his interactions with Derrick, and he recognized Derrick’s and Officer Jansen’s voices on
the audio recording (Tr., p.481, L.6 – p.482, L.11).

Moreover, Officer Jansen had

previously testified to having recorded his 35-minute conversation with Derrick, and his
testimony established the foundation for the admission of State’s Exhibit 5, which he
represented was an audio recording of the conversation that had been “condensed to
omit” “dead space” and casual conversation “about cars and stuff like that.” (Tr., p.352,
L.15 – p.355, L.14.) Finally, when asked by the district court whether the audio recording
captured on State’s Exhibit 9 was included in any of the previously admitted audio
exhibits, the prosecutor clarified that it was not and explained, “This is part of the extra
stuff that was taken out, like the joking and talking about the weather and things like
that.” (Tr., p.483, Ls.1-8.)
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In light of the foregoing evidence, the district court acted well within its discretion
in concluding the state met its burden under I.R.E. 901(a) of presenting “evidence
sufficient to support a finding that [State’s Exhibit 9] [was] what its proponent
claim[ed]”: an audio recording of part of Derrick’s conversation with Officer Jansen on
the night of the charged crimes. Officer Hayes’ testimony that he was present on the
night in question, was aware that Officer Jansen was recording his conversation with
Derrick, and had reviewed the audio recording and recognized both Derrick’s and Officer
Jansen’s voices on it was sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the foundational showings
contemplated by I.R.E. 901(b)(1) (“[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter
is what it is claimed to be”) and 901(b)(5) (voice identification).

That testimony,

combined with Officer Jansen’s prior testimony regarding having recorded his 35-minute
conversation with Derrick—only a “condensed” portion of which had been previously
admitted—also provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that State’s
Exhibit 9 was, as the state claimed, an audio recording of a portion of the conversation
that had been redacted from State’s Exhibit 5. See I.R.E. 901(b)(4) (authentication
requirements of I.R.E. 901(a) may be established by “[a]ppearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with
circumstances”); cf., Koch, 157 Idaho at 96-98, 334 P.3d at 287-289 (foundation for
admission of text messages may be established by circumstantial evidence). Because the
state presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the foundational requirements for admission
of State’s Exhibit 9, Derrick cannot show the district court abused its discretion in
overruling his foundation objection and admitting the exhibit.
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Citing State v. Bradley, supra, Derrick argues the state’s foundational showing
was not sufficient because, having not been present during the portion of the conversation
captured on State’s Exhibit 9, and having not set up Officer Jansen’s recording device,
“Officer Hayes did not have the knowledge to testify that the audio recording is what it is
claimed to be—a complete and accurate recording of that portion of the conversation
between Mr. Derrick and Officer Jansen.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-18.) The state
acknowledges the factual distinctions between Bradley and this case—specifically, that
the officer through whose testimony the state laid foundation for the admission of audio
recordings of two telephone conversations in Bradley “testified that he set up the
recording device, was present during both phone calls” and “heard a majority of what was
said during the telephone conversation,” and had “reviewed the audio recordings and they
accurately reflected what he heard while the device was recording.” Bradley, 158 Idaho
at 69, 343 P.3d at 511.

Contrary to Derrick’s assertions, however, these factual

distinctions do not compel a finding that the state failed to lay sufficient foundation for
the admission of the audio recording at issue in this case; while the Court in Bradley held
the evidence in that case was sufficient to establish foundation for admission of the audio
recordings, the Court did not hold the presentation of such evidence is the only means by
which the state can meet its burden of establishing the authentication requirement of
I.R.E. 901(a). In fact, both I.R.E. 901 and the case law interpreting it (and its federal
counterpart) suggest the opposite.
As noted above, I.R.E. 901(b)(4) specifically contemplates that the foundational
requirements of I.R.E. 901(a) may be satisfied by reference to the proffered exhibit’s
“[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,
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taken in conjunction with circumstances.” Consistent with the language of this provision,
the Idaho Supreme Court has held, albeit in the context of addressing the foundational
requirements for the admission of emails and text messages, that the proponent of
evidence may demonstrate its authenticity through circumstantial evidence. Koch, 157
Idaho at 97, 334 P.3d at 288; see also id. at 96, 334 P.3d at 287 (citing State v.
Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617, 624 (N.D. 2010) (“[C]ourts have held that circumstantial
evidence establishing that the evidence was what the proponent claimed it to be was
sufficient.”). Courts interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 901—the federal counterpart
of I.R.E. 901—likewise hold that the authenticity of evidence, including audio recordings,
may be established circumstantially. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 715 F.3d 1032,
1035-37 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding “government provided ample circumstantial evidence” to
establish “accuracy and trustworthiness” of proffered audio recordings); Lexington Ins.
Co. v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 423 F.3d 318, 328-29 (3rd Cir. 2005) (noting “the
burden of proof for authentication is slight” and may be satisfied through the presentation
of circumstantial evidence” (internal quotations, brackets and citations omitted)); United
States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990) (“There need be only some
competent evidence in the record to support authentication, which can consist of merely
circumstantial evidence.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
Because the state could meet it burden of establishing foundation for the
admission of State’s Exhibit 9 by either direct or circumstantial evidence, the fact that
Officer Hayes was not personally present during the portion of the conversation contained
on that exhibit was not fatal to its admission. As noted above, Officer Hayes was present
during other portions of the conversation between Officer Jansen and Derrick, was aware
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that Officer Jansen was recording the conversation, and recognized both Officer Jansen’s
and Derrick’s voices on the audio recording. This testimony, combined with Officer
Jansen’s prior testimony regarding his conversation with Derrick and his recording
thereof, was sufficient evidence that, “taken in conjunction with [the] circumstances,”
I.R.E. 901(b)(4), supported the district court’s finding that State’s Exhibit 9 was, as the
state claimed, an audio recording of a portion of Officer Jansen’s conversation with
Derrick on the night of the charged crimes.
To the extent Derrick is arguing on appeal that the state failed to lay adequate
foundation for the admission of State’s Exhibit 9 because Officer Hayes had no personal
knowledge whether the recording had been modified, such argument is directly
controlled, and foreclosed, by Bradley, supra. Like the argument Derrick appears to be
making in this case, Bradley argued that, because the officer through whose testimony the
state sought to admit the audio recordings at issue in that case “did not hear every word of
the recorded conversations, he could not know if the recordings had been modified or
not.” Bradley, 158 Idaho at 69, 343 P.3d at 511. While the Idaho Court of Appeals
“agree[d] that a proper foundation for an audio recording ought to include evidence that it
has not been modified,” the Court declined to hold that such showing could be made
“only through direct testimony denying tampering.” Id. The Court accepted the officer’s
testimony that the recordings “were an accurate representation of the conversations he
recorded” as an “[i]mplicit” representation that the recordings “were not modified.” Id. at
70, 343 P.3d at 512. The Court also noted that Bradley “pointed to nothing in the
recordings, or any other evidence at trial, that would indicate the recordings had been
modified.” Id. Because Bradley “merely speculate[d] that the recordings could have
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been modified by some unknown party,” he “failed to raise a colorable assertion of any
defect in the audio recordings,” sufficient to show error in their admission. Id.
Like Bradley, Derrick has pointed to nothing in State’s Exhibit 9 or to any other
evidence in the trial record that would indicate the audio recording of Officer Jansen’s
partial conversation with Derrick had been modified. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.13-19.)
Nor did he ever claim a lack of accuracy below. (See Tr., p.482, Ls.19-25 (objecting to
admission of State’s Exhibit 9 based on argument that “foundation for Officer Jansen’s
conversation” could not “be laid second-handedly by Officer Hayes”), p.483, Ls.9-15
(trial court overruling foundation objection because, inter alia, there was “no indication
of lack of accuracy of the recordings”).) Instead, like Bradley, Derrick merely speculates
that the recording could have been modified, and he does so even though he was a party
to the recorded conversation. While it was the state’s burden below to present evidence
that the recording accurately portrayed the conversation between Officer Jansen and
Derrick, it met that burden through the presentation of the circumstantial evidence,
discussed above, that demonstrated the exhibit was what the state purported it to be.
Because Derrick never challenged the accuracy of the exhibit, either before or after its
admission, Derrick, like Bradley, has failed to raise a colorable claim of any defect in the
recording and has, thus, failed to show the district court abused its discretion in admitting
State’s Exhibit 9 over his foundation objection.

D.

Even If The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The Audio Recording
Over Derrick’s Foundation Objection, The Error Was Harmless
Even when the trial court has abused its discretion, such “abuse of discretion may

be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected. In the case of an incorrect ruling
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regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a
substantial right of one of the parties.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247
P.3d 582, 590 (2010); accord I.R.E. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ….”);
I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.”). “An error is harmless if a reviewing court can find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the
admission of the challenged evidence.” State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 887, 119
P.3d 653, 662 (Ct. App. 2005).
Even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting State’s Exhibit 9, the
error did not affect Derrick’s substantial rights. The state offered the exhibit in rebuttal,
to counter Derrick’s testimony that it was hot outside on the night of the charged crimes
and that he was nervous when talking with the police. (Tr., p.478, L.20 – p.485, L.21.)
On the recording, Derrick told Officer Jansen that he was “kind of chilly” and he asked
and was granted permission to get his jacket out of his vehicle. (State’s Exhibit 9 at 0:100:50.) He also intermittently laughed and made jokes during the recorded conversation.
(See generally State’s Exhibit 9.) This evidence did tend to rebut Derrick’s testimony
that it was hot outside, but it was not necessarily inconsistent with Derrick’s claim that he
was nervous and, in any event, it was entirely cumulative of evidence that had already
been admitted.
During the state’s case-in-chief Officer Jansen testified that Derrick “seemed very
nervous” and that “[h]e was cracking jokes and just had a very nervous feel to him.” (Tr.,
p.363, Ls.2-14.) Officer Hayes likewise testified during the state’s rebuttal case (but
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before State’s Exhibit 9 was admitted) that Derrick seemed “[a] little bit nervous” and
“anxious to get out of there,” but that he also “seemed to make light of the situation.”
(Tr., p.479, L.20 – p.480, L.19.) He also testified that it “was fairly cold” outside on the
night in question and that, based on his review of an audio—which had not yet been
offered or admitted—he knew Derrick had asked for a jacket. (Tr., p.478, L.20 – p.479,
L.19.)
Considering the trial record as a whole, it is clear that Derrick’s recorded
statements contained on State’s Exhibit 9 were, at worst, merely cumulative of evidence
the jury had already received. As such, the admission of those statements, even if error,
was harmless. See State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27, 205 P.3d 671, 676 (Ct. App. 2009)
(error in admission of evidence was harmless where “erroneously admitted evidence was
merely cumulative” of other evidence presented at trial). Moreover, because State’s
Exhibit 9 did not actually rebut Derrick’s testimony that he was nervous, and because
both officers testified that Derrick did seem nervous during their encounters with him,
there is no reasonable possibility that the audio recording offered in rebuttal affected the
outcome of the trial. If there was error it was harmless.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered upon
the jury verdict finding Derrick guilty of felony injury to a child.
DATED this 23rd day of February, 2018.
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